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JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT, WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS,
AND THE VALUE OF PRESERVATION: THE CASE OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Elizabeth Price Foley*
The constitution and laws of a State are rarely attacked from the front; it is against secret and
gradual attacks that a Nation must chiefly guard.... [C]hanges are overlooked when they
come about insensibly by a series of steps which are scarcely noted. One would do a great
service to Nations by showing from history how many States have thus changed their whole
nature and lost their original constitution.'
INTRODUCTION
Written constitutions are arguably the best, most important invention
of law. A written social compact, superior to ordinary laws, allows citizens
to understand both the powers possessed by their government and, con-
versely, the rights retained by the people. The difficulty, however, is that
words used in a written constitution are often imprecise; they do not always
convey or capture the full, contextual meaning understood by those who
wrote and ratified them. This meaning gap ineluctably grows larger with the
passage of time. What was widely understood in year one of a constitution
becomes fuzzier in year fifty, even fuzzier in year 100, and may be all but
lost by year 200.
Those living in year 200 may not only lack understanding of the mean-
ing of the constitution's words but-far worse-they may not even care.
They may take the position that their written constitution is "living"-that
what the words meant over 200 years ago should not really matter anymore
because it is what the people want or need them to mean today that is im-
portant. Unfortunately, the living constitution position is inherently unstable
and, when properly understood, undermines the entire purpose of having a
written constitution in the first place. As George Will once aptly expressed
it, "A constitution is supposed to freeze things. It is an anti-evolutionary
device."2
* Elizabeth Price Foley is the Institute for Justice Chair in Constitutional Litigation and Professor
of Law at Florida International University College of Law. She would like to thank Clark Neily and
David Rivkin for sharing their ideas about the scope and limits of judicial engagement. Any opinions
and errors in this Article are, of course, solely those of the author.
3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 18
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
2 This Week (ABC television broadcast July 3,2011) (comments of George Will).
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Living constitutionalism is an interpretive methodology that allows the
meaning of the carefully chosen words of a written constitution to change
with the times, morphing and stretching on an as-needed basis.' Under this
methodology, judges reinterpret those words to suit some perceived politi-
cal or pragmatic expediency. Such flexibility may be convenient, but it
places far too much power in the hands of judges-particularly, in the U.S.
system, the nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court-and over time, causes
the citizenry to view their written Constitution as little more than a politi-
cally manipulable blob of Play-Doh. If there is a perception that something
is "amiss" with the Constitution as written, such a system simply defaults to
a "let the judges fix it" mentality.4 There is no need for "We the People" to
get involved, and certainly no need to resort to "cumbersome" formal
amendment processes.'
When judges alter a written constitution because its original meaning
is no longer convenient, useful or modern, they engage in judicial activism.6
They are actively seeking to modify the written social compact to suit their
own, or their perception of society's, current preferences. Judicial activism
is a usurpation of the proper judicial role, and it undermines the proper role
of We the People. Only the People may amend the written constitution
when a sufficiently large number (i.e., a supermajority) believes strongly
enough that a formal, written modification of the social charter is neces-
sary.' As eloquently articulated by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No.
78:
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the estab-
lished form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no pre-
sumption or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a depar-
ture from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon
portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution,
where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.
Hamilton's prescience is obvious. His fear that "it would require an
uncommon portion of fortitude" for judges "to do their duty as faithful
guardians of the Constitution" has proven true.9 Construction of many of
the most important rights-protecting portions of the Constitution has result-
3 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 47 (1997).
4 See Elizabeth Price Foley, The Role of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation:
Original Meaning, Sovereignty and the Ninth Amendment, 3 FlU L. REv. 27, 29-30 (2007) (discussing
the democratic harms inherent in living constitutionalism).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring approval of constitutional amendments by two-thirds of both
houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the States).
6 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (3d Pocket ed. 2001).
7 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468-69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
9 Id.
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ed in virtually unbridled activism, and woefully inadequate judicial en-
gagement. Judicial engagement refers to the need for judges to enforce the
written constitution, even when doing so may strike the judge as pragmati-
cally difficult, politically unpalatable, or even morally wrong.'o A judge
who is properly engaged, in other words, is a judge who views her job as
one of enforcing and preserving the written Constitution." In the words of
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, judicial engagement means that the
judge is "bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution,"l 2
even though she may vehemently disagree with the end result of her deci-
sion. An engaged judge understands her role as an interpreter; a neutral
third party who must endeavor to implement the meaning of a regulation,
statute, or, in this particular case, a constitution that is consonant with the
meaning of those who wrote and formally approved its text. An engaged
judge will not re-write the text to suit her own preferences or her perception
of the preferences of a new generation. By construing the written text con-
sonant with its original meaning, an engaged judge preserves the writing.
Engaged judges thus show immense respect for the republican processes
that created written legal texts, be they regulations, statutes, or constitu-
tions. Engaged judges' refusal to construe laws to "fit the times" exhibit
deference to the will of the people, who always possess the ultimate power
to trump judges' construction by repealing or amending the text. Alexander
Hamilton articulated this view of the proper role of judges in Federalist No.
78, in which he assured the American public that giving judges the power to
invalidate statutes inconsistent with the Constitution did not imply a superi-
ority of the judiciary over the legislature, but merely that,
the power of the people is superior to both, and that where the will of the legislature, de-
clared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution,
the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate
their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental. '3
This Article will explore the difference between judicial activism and
judicial engagement by examining the Supreme Court's evolutionary ap-
proach to individual rights. I hope to convince the reader that judges have
strayed too far afield from the Constitution's original meaning in the realm
of individual rights, engaging in judicial activism rather than appropriate
judicial engagement. Following this analysis, I will offer a plausible and
to Chip Mellor, Mellor: Judicial Engagement, PHILLY.COM (June 4, 2011, 8:00 AM),
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inqed-board/Mellor-Judicial-engagement.html.
11 Cf Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1284 (11th Cir.) ("When
Congress oversteps those outer limits [of its powers under the Constitution], the Constitution requires
judicial engagement, not judicial abdication."), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI ("[A]ll ... judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . .
13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,supra note 8, at 466.
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familiar solution to the problem of activism-a blueprint, if you will, for
getting our judges properly engaged in enforcing our written Constitution.
I. THE FIRST CENTURY OF RIGHTS: DENYING THE APPLICABILITY OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST THE STATES
Judicial enforcement of individual rights has long been problematic.
Throughout much of our early constitutional history, the Bill of Rights has
been viewed as inapplicable to the States.14 Even after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Court
has continued its reticence to incorporate the Bill of Rights to the States.
The net result is that, to a large degree, judicial engagement in the protec-
tion of individual rights has been slow, haphazard, and incomplete.
A. Incorporation Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment
I have written elsewhere that the long road to "incorporation" of the
Bill of Rights-making them binding on the States as well as the federal
government-was unfortunate and arguably inappropriate." The Bill of
Rights itself-other than the First Amendment, which explicitly targets the
U.S. Congress," and the Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause,
which explicitly targets the federal courts-does not, as a textual matter,
indicate whether the rights contained therein are enjoyed only vis-i-vis the
newly created federal sovereign or the state sovereigns as well.' The Bill's
explicit mention of the federal sovereign in the First and Seventh Amend-
ments suggests an awareness of the need to specify the sovereign against
which the right applied. This construction could reasonably imply that all
other provisions of the Bill were rights enjoyed simpliciter, against all gov-
ernments within the newly formed United States.
This broad view of the Bill of Rights is certainly unorthodox, at least
when viewed through modern eyes. We are all taught early on that the Su-
preme Court, in its 1833 decision Barron v. Baltimore,'" roundly rejected
the idea that the Bill of Rights could be binding on the States." In Barron,
Chief Justice John Marshall rejected the notion that the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause could be binding on the States, and more broadly declared
14 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights was
not binding on the States).
15 ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, LIBERTY FOR ALL: RECLAIMING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN A NEw ERA
OF PUBLIC MORALITY 23-35 (2006).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .....
17 See generally U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
18 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
19 Id. at 250.
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in dicta that the remainder of the Bill "contain[s] no expression indicating
an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so
apply them."20
Oddly, Marshall's opinion in Barron never even acknowledged the
fact that several high state courts reached the opposite conclusion, holding
that various provisions of the Bill of Rights were indeed binding on them.2 1
Even the U.S. Supreme Court, fourteen years before Barron, seemed con-
fused, writing an opinion that assumed at least a part of the Bill of Rights
was binding on the States. Specifically, in an opinion ironically penned by
Chief Justice Marshall, Bank of Columbia v. Okely,22 the Court unanimous-
ly concluded that a Maryland summary debt collection law was consonant
with the Seventh Amendment's right to civil jury trial, clearly implying that
the amendment was binding on the States.2
In addition, for several decades after the broad dicta in Barron, state
supreme courts balked, insisting that they were bound by portions of the
federal Bill of Rights.24 Prominent lawyers continued to hold the belief or
impression (whichever one chooses to call it) that the Bill of Rights was
binding on the States. This belief persisted among many members of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress who debated and approved the Fourteenth Amend-
20 id.
21 State v. Moor, I Miss. 134, 138 (1823) (Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause); State v.
Ledford, 3 Mo. 102, 105-06, 110 (1832) (Fifth Amendment Indictment and Due Process Clauses); State
v. Powell, 7 N.J.L. 244, 245 (1823) (Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause); People v. Goodwin, 18
Johns. 187, 200-01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) (Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause).
22 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819).
23 Id. at 244 (stating that the Maryland law gave "full effect to the seventh amendment of the
constitution" because "the words are, that the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, which places it on
the foot of a lex pro se introducta, and the benefit of it therefore may be relinquished").
24 See State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 28 (1842) (determining that a concealed weapon prohibition
did not violate the Second Amendment); Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 366-67 (1852) ("[I]t is in vian
[sic] to shield [the people] from a blow aimed by the Federal arm, if they are liable to be prostrated by
one dealt with equal fatality by their own [State].. . . It was not because it was supposed that legislation
over the subjects here enumerated [in the Bill of Rights] might be better and more safely entrusted to the
State governments, that it was prohibited to Congress. It was to declare to the world the fixed and unal-
terable determination of our people, that these invaluable rights which had been established at so great a
cost of blood and treasure, should never disturbed by any government."); Nunn v. State, I Ga. 243, 250-
51 (1846) (describing the Second Amendment as binding on the state, because some portions of the Bill
of Rights "were designed for the benefit of every citizen of the Union in all courts and in all places; and
the people of the several States, in ratifying them in their respective State conventions, have virtually
adopted them as a beacon-lights to guide and control the action of their own legislatures, as well as that
of Congress"); Rhinehart v. Schuyler, 7 Ill. 473, 523 (1846) (finding the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause binding on the State); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633, 633-34 (1856) (assuming that the
Second Amendment applied to the States, but did not prohibit police regulations necessary for public
safety); Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 457 (1836) (assuming the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause requirement was applicable and violated); McDaniel v. State, 16 Miss. 401, 416 (1847) (assuming
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause was binding on state courts but not violated by introduc-
tion of a dying declaration).
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ment for ratification. For example, Republican Robert Hale of New York
objected to the original draft of the Fourteenth Amendment because he
thought it would give Congress too much power over the States.25 Notably,
Hale believed the Bill of Rights was already binding on the States, so there
was no need to enlarge congressional power to protect the rights of U.S.
citizens and the newly emancipated slaves:
Now, what are these amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten ... ? What
is the nature and object of these articles? They do not contain, from beginning to end, a grant
of power anywhere. On the contrary, they are all restrictions of power. They constitute the
bill of rights, a bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defining and limiting the
power of the Federal and State legislation. They are not matters upon which legislation can
be based.
26
The House sponsor of the Fourteenth Amendment (and the amend-
ment's original drafter, Representative John Bingham of Ohio), responded
to Hale by challenging him to "point to a single decision" of federal or state
courts in which the Bill of Rights had been held applicable to the states for
the benefit of citizens, including African Americans. 27 Hale responded that
he had
not been able to prepare a brief for this argument, and therefore [could not] refer the gentle-
man to any case. ... But still I have, somehow or other, gone along with the impression that
there is some sort of protection thrown over us in some way, whether with or without the
sanction of a judicial decision that we are so protected. Of course, I may be entirely mistaken
in all this, but I have somehow had that impression.
28
At this point, Representative Eldridge of Wisconsin chimed in, expressing
similar views to Hale, and asking Bingham if he "ha[d] found or heard of a
case in which the Constitution of the United States has been pronounced to
be insufficient [to protect the rights of citizens]?" 29 Bingham replied the
next day on the floor of the House, citing Barron to his colleagues.30
Similarly, the Senate sponsor of the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator
Jacob Howard of Michigan, explained to his Senate colleagues that the
Constitution contained "a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights" that
had been held not binding on the States.3' According to Senator Howard,
the purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was thus "to restrain
the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great
25 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1064 (1866).
26 id
27 Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham of Ohio).
28 id.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 1089-90.
31 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2765 (1866).
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fundamental guarantees,"32 imposing "a general prohibition upon all the
States, as such, from abridging the privileges and immunities of the citizens
of the United States." 33
These exchanges among members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress show
there was deep and abiding misunderstanding of the scope and applicability
of the Bill of Rights well after Barron was decided, and even among the
nation's elite. And because the states notoriously disregarded what were
widely perceived to be the fundamental rights of humankind-at least when
it came to African-American slaves or abolitionists-the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment believed the amendment
would make the Bill of Rights formally binding upon the States.34 As Jus-
tice Thomas's thorough research in McDonald v. City of Chicago" showed,
these congressional speeches articulating the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment were widely circulated to the ratifying public via pamphlets
and newspapers."
B. Incorporation After the Fourteenth Amendment
The portion of the Fourteenth Amendment designed to bind the Bill of
Rights on the States was the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Unfortu-
nately, in its 1873, 5-4 decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases," the Supreme
Court held that the "privileges or immunities" referred to by the Fourteenth
Amendment were only rights that "owe their existence to the Federal gov-
ernment, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws."39 Curiously,
this did not include the Bill of Rights, but merely an odd list of things such
as accessing the federal government and transacting business with it, ac-
cessing national seaports, demanding protection of one's life, liberty, and
property when on the high seas or abroad, petitioning the government for a
redress of grievances by the federal government, and the writ of habeas
corpus.4 Four dissenting Justices, led by Justice Stephen J. Field, ardently
asserted that the majority's narrow interpretation made the Privileges or
Immunities Clause "a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished noth-
32 Id. at 2766.
3 Id. at 2765.
34 See id at 1088, 1090.
3 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
36 See id. at 3074 ("As a whole, these well-circulated speeches indicate that § I was understood to
enforce constitutionally declared rights against the States, and they provide no suggestion that any
language in the section other than the Privileges or Immunities Clause would accomplish that task.").
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .....
38 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36(1873).
39Id. at 79.
40 Id. at 79-80.
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ing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its pas-
sage." 4 1
The net effect of the Slaughterhouse Cases was that after fighting an
extremely bloody Civil War, the only legal changes accomplished were
ending the institution of slavery,42 deeming the freed slaves official U.S.
"citizens,"43 and granting African Americans the right to vote." The key
constitutional provision designed to ensure that equal rights were provid-
ed-the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-
was gutted by the decision. Not only did the Slaughterhouse Cases effec-
tively take a black marker and mark out the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, but the 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,45 in blessing the doc-
trine of "separate but equal," gutted the effectiveness of the amendment's
other key provision, the Equal Protection Clause."
The Slaughterhouse and Plessy decisions thus made it impossible for
many decades to even consider making the Bill of Rights binding on the
States. Indeed, after these decisions, the only portion of the Fourteenth
Amendment remaining legally in play as a vehicle for incorporation was the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-rather ironic, since this
Clause, by its own words, is designed to ensure fair process is provided
before individuals' life, liberty or property can be deprived. This Clause
does not, as a textual matter, protect any substantive rights.47 Despite this
textual and arguably even contextual understanding of the nature of due
process,4 8 the Supreme Court, if it wanted to incorporate the Bill of Rights,
had only two choices: overrule Slaughterhouse, or look to the Due Process
Clause.
41 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
43 Id. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.").
44 Id. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude.").
45 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46 See id. at 550-52; see also id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47 See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The notion that
a constitutional provision that guarantees only 'process' before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or
property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of
words.").
48 Id. (noting that no one on the present Court "argues that the [substantive] meaning they attribute
to the Due Process Clause was consistent with public understanding at the time of its ratifica-
tion. ... [A]ny serious argument over the scope of the Due Process Clause must acknowledge that
neither its text nor its history suggests that it protects the many substantive rights this Court's cases now
claim it does").
[VOL. 19:4916
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The Court chose the latter approach. Beginning in 1925, in Gitlow v.
New York,49 the Supreme Court took the first step toward incorporating the
Bill of Rights using the Due Process Clause. And in an ironic twist, the first
portion of the Bill of Rights incorporated was the First Amendment-odd
because the First Amendment is the only portion of the Bill of Rights, other
than the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, that textually
applies only to the federal government. It explicitly declares that "Congress
shall make no law" prohibiting free speech and press, etc.
Since Gitlow, incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Pro-
cess Clause has become the accepted method of the Court. Incorporation,
however, has not been total, but "selective." Although Justice Hugo Black
adamantly insisted that the entirety of the enumerated rights in the Bill of
Rights should be binding on the States (thus excluding the Ninth Amend-
ment),50 a majority of the Court has never accepted total incorporation, in-
stead preferring a clause-by-clause, incremental approach."' The ability to
incrementally make the Bill of Rights binding on the States is likely one
reason why the Court opted not to simply overrule Slaughterhouse. If the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" referred to the
Bill of Rights, that Clause would demand that the entire Bill be immediate-
ly binding upon the States, not just bits and pieces of it. The Court's selec-
tive incorporation approach using the Due Process Clause has thus given it
control over the timing and content of the rights incorporated against the
States. At present, very few portions of the Bill have not been incorporated.
A few notable exceptions include the Indictment Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Seventh Amendment's right to civil jury trial, and the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines.52
The Court's first century of rights jurisprudence thus evinces a re-
markable reticence to extend the protections of the Bill of Rights to citizens
as against their own States. The applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
States, as a textual and contextual matter, was a lot more ambiguous than
49 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
50 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Black later expressed
his belief that the proper basis for making the Bill of Rights binding upon the States was the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) ("'No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States' seem to me an eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights
shall apply to the States. What more precious 'privilege' of American citizenship could there be than
that privilege to claim the protections of our great Bill of Rights? I suggest that any reading of 'privileg-
es or immunities of citizens of the United States' which excludes the Bill of Rights' safeguards renders
the words of this section of the Fourteenth Amendment meaningless." (footnote omitted)).
51 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034 (majority opinion) ("While Justice Black's theory was never
adopted, the Court eventually moved in that direction by initiating what has been called a process of
'selection incorporation,' i.e., the Court began to hold that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates
particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments.").
52 Id. at 3034-35 & n.13.
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Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Barron revealed. Many high state courts
had, in fact, considered their States bound by various provisions of the Bill,
and indeed continued to do so, in defiance of Barron, for many decades
afterwards." Even after the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment-whose Privileges or Immunities Clause was clearly designed
to make the Bill binding on the States-the Supreme Court refused to inter-
pret the text in a way consonant with its original meaning.
Indeed, the hallmark of the Supreme Court's first century of constitu-
tional rights interpretation is a contortion of the constitutional text and a
blatant disregard of its historical context, with the goal of giving the States
a free pass from the Bill of Rights. This first century was thus a living con-
stitutionalism century, in which Justices of the Court felt it their paternal-
istic duty to preserve the Union by kowtowing to "states' rights."54 They did
so not because this is what the Constitution or its historical meaning de-
manded-it most certainly did not-but because they felt free to disregard
constitutional text and context in the name of some unspoken greater good,
moral sensibility, or other subjective motivation. The net result of such liv-
ing constitutionalism, as is always the case, is that the will of the people,
evidenced by their fundamental charter of government, was thwarted, and
protection for their most fundamental individual rights was denied against
their state governments. Judges in this first century were not "engaged" in
protecting and defending the Constitution; they went out of their way to
ignore and contort it to reach desired ends.
II. THE SECOND CENTURY OF RIGHTS: BIFURCATING RIGHTS BY "TYPE"
AND CREATING TIERS OF REVIEW
The Fourteenth Amendment and its subsequent jurisprudence ushered
in a period of incorporation unanticipated by both earlier courts and the
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Court's second century, the
Court's due process jurisprudence gave rise to unexpected, categorical divi-
sions of rights: economic and non-economic, enumerated and
unenumerated, fundamental and non-fundamental. These divisions repre-
sented a further retreat from the Court's willingness to engage in textual
and contextual judicial engagement.
53 See cases cited supra note 24.
54 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16.
Wall.) 36, 78-79 (1873); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
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A. Devaluing Economic Rights
Once the Supreme Court found an acceptable vehicle by which it felt
comfortable incorporating the Bill of Rights, it also expressed its belief that
certain rights were more "valuable" than other rights. The beginning of this
distinction occurred with a 5-4 decision of the New Deal Court, Nebbia v.
New York," a due process challenge to a New York law setting retail prices
for milk." Mr. Nebbia, a grocery store proprietor, claimed that governmen-
tal price fixing deprived him of his property and liberty of contract without
due process." The Court rejected these contentions, reasoning that "the
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means select-
ed shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be at-
tained.""
The Nebbia decision articulated an early version of rational basis re-
view for assertions of "economic" rights as against laws regulating the con-
duct of business.59 But the Nebbia Court's rational basis review was quite a
different beast from the modern version of this standard: it permitted inval-
idation of economic laws only if the court found them "unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious," but it also demanded proof from the government "that
the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained."" This last requirement-a close fit between the pur-
pose of the law and the means used to achieve it-is notably absent from
modern rational basis review." While on the surface Nebbia seems conso-
nant with modem rational basis review, it was in fact much less deferential,
and notably more searching in its quest for a means-end fit. The rational
basis standard of review articulated in Nebbia applied to all laws chal-
lenged under the Due Process Clauses. Bifurcation of standards of review
according to the type of law being challenged did not develop until several
years later.
The seed of modern rational basis review was sown in the infamous
"Footnote Four" of the 1937 decision in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.62 In Footnote Four, the Court for the first time suggested that altering
the "degree of scrutiny" would be desirable according to the type of law
5 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
56 Id. at 515.
57 Id. at 521-23.
58 Id. at 525.
59 See id. at 537 ("If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satis-
fled .... ").
60 Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
61 See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
62 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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being challenged." Pursuant to Footnote Four, a law that "on its face" of-
fends "a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments" were deemed inappropriate for the presumption of consti-
tutionality (i.e., rational basis review) and thus demanded closer judicial
scrutiny.' Similarly, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws directed at
certain "discrete and insular minorities" were to be presumed unconstitu-
tional and given closer scrutiny."
The net effect of Footnote Four was that economic rights were given
second-class status because laws restricting economic rights-most notably
the liberty of contract-did not "on their face" offend a "specific prohibi-
tion" of the Bill of Rights. As a result, laws affecting economic liberty-
minimum wages, maximum hours, licensure, etc.-were presumed consti-
tutional and could be invalidated only if the Court could imagine no rational
basis for the law.' By contrast, any law affecting other, non-economic
rights-enumerated rights such as speech, press, search and seizure, and the
like-are presumed unconstitutional and carefully scrutinized by the court,
to ensure that the government has an "important" or "compelling" justifica-
tion for the law and that it is "narrowly tailored" or "substantially related"
to that justification.67
As any modem law student knows, the result of all this is that we have
two distinct classes of constitutional rights under the Due Process Clauses:
economic and non-economic. The former are virtually always upheld, in
rubber stamp fashion, and the latter are often (but not always) closely scru-
tinized by the judiciary, demanding both a sufficiently compelling purpose
and a tight means-end fit ("narrow tailoring") to pass constitutional muster.
63 Footnote Four states:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal ofundesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes di-
rected at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities, [or] whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
65 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
66 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488,491 (1955).
67 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to begin with,
that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them
to the most rigid scrutiny.").
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Consider the classic articulation of rational basis review of Williamson v.
Lee Optical,' in which the Court unanimously declared:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.... We can-
not say that the regulation has no rational relation to that objective [reducing commercialism
in health care] and therefore is beyond constitutional bounds.69
Notice that, under rational basis review, the citizen challenging the
economic law not only bears the burden of persuasion, but this burden is
nearly impossible to meet: She must convince the court that there is no con-
ceivable legitimate purpose served by the law. The government bears virtu-
ally no burden whatsoever; even if the "legitimate purpose" posited is not
actually served by the law, the court must nonetheless sustain it." The only
thing a court does, in a rational basis case, is simply check to see that the
legislature was not acting utterly and completely irrationally. If there was
any rational thought conceivable behind the law-even if it was not actual-
ly on the minds of most of the legislators who voted for it-the law will be
upheld." Needless to say, for the citizen aggrieved by an economic law,
invoking rational basis review is likely to trigger a rubber stamping exer-
cise, devoid of meaningful, intelligent judicial inquiry.
Strict scrutiny is reserved exclusively for non-economic rights that are
deemed "fundamental" in nature.72 Strict scrutiny is so demanding, in fact,
that law professors often tell their students that it is "'strict' in theory fatal
in fact."" Yet this common understanding of strict scrutiny may be more
hyperbole than fact. A comprehensive empirical study conducted by Profes-
sor Adam Winkler revealed that, of all federal court decisions employing
68 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
69 Id. at 488, 491 (emphasis added).
70 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) ("A statute is presumed constitutional, and
'[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it,' whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally, courts are
compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an
imperfect fit between means and ends." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))).
71 See id.
72 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) ("[B]y establishing a threshold re-
quirement-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more than a
reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need for complex
balancing of competing interests in every case.").
73 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
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strict scrutiny between 1990 and 2003, 30 percent resulted in the law being
upheld.74
One reasonable implication of Winkler's study is that strict scrutiny,
far from being a death knell to an action, is in fact a tough but survivable
standard. This, in turn, suggests that its highly deferential cousin, rational
basis review, may tilt the scales too far and unnecessarily in the govern-
ment's favor. Because rational basis does not require the government to
prove anything-the citizen challenging the law bears the burden of con-
vincing the court that the law is utterly irrational-it sacrifices meaningful
judicial engagement in pursuit of a make-believe notion that complete def-
erence is necessary to preserve the integrity of republican legislative pro-
cesses. If Winkler's study is accurate, it seems logical to conclude that
something more demanding than modem rational basis review, but less
demanding than strict scrutiny, achieves a more appropriate balance be-
tween the competing goals of enforcing the Constitution and restraining
judges from substituting their own views for those of democratically elected
representatives.
Equally important, the bifurcation of rights into arbitrary categories-
nowhere mentioned in the text or the historical context of the Constitu-
tion-is once again an example of judicial activism. Categorizing asserted
rights into economic and non-economic categories is entirely judge-created
doctrine, and it seem to have been devised for no other reason than to ena-
ble the post-New Deal Court to more easily carry out the progressive eco-
nomic agenda, creating significant doctrinal wiggle room for the Court to
uphold laws regulating the economy. This is more than a little ironic, as
rational basis review is often justified on the basis that it keeps judges from
imposing their subjective preferences and reversing the will of the people as
expressed through their democratic branches. Yet the Court's own decision
during the New Deal Era to give economic rights second-class status-and
thus only rational basis review-is a rather severe imposition of judicial
preferences. This action trumps the will of the people expressed in the Con-
stitution, which is by definition a higher law than any ordinary statute. The
bifurcation of rights into economic and non-economic categories is classic
activism, and a refusal of the Court to engage in meaningful review of any
law is claimed to violate any constitutional right.
B. Devaluing Unenumerated Rights
In addition to the bifurcation of rights into economic and non-
economic categories, the Court has also elected to further divide rights into
74 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 815 tb.1 (2006).
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enumerated and unenumerated rights." This division is contrary to the text
and historical context of the Ninth Amendment, which states: "The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to de-
ny or disparage others retained by the people."" Yet precisely by bifurcat-
ing rights into enumerated and unenumerated categories, the Court's juris-
prudence has disparaged these "other" rights retained by the people.
Unenumerated rights-like economic rights-are given second-class status,
and are skeptically viewed by many jurists who fear being labeled as "activ-
ist" judges. As the Court acknowledged in Washington v. Glucksberg,n
recognition of new, unenumerated rights requires the "exercise [of] the ut-
most care . . . lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court.""
It is understandable why judges-particularly those, such as federal
judges, who are appointed rather than elected-would be cautious in recog-
nizing rights not specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution.
Recognizing constitutional rights thwarts republican processes in the sense
that doing so places those rights beyond the reach of majoritarian prefer-
ences, entrenching them within the safe confines of supreme constitutional
law." Judges that are too eager to recognize constitutional rights would thus
take for themselves great power, commensurately reducing the scope of
representative democracy.
Yet the Ninth Amendment tells judges not to construe the Constitution
in such a rights-restricting way.so The Ninth Amendment is about as clear as
constitutional text can be, informing judges and the people that it is perfect-
ly legitimate-and hence, not "activist"-to be willing and able to recog-
nize rights other than those specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Con-
stitution." As James Madison, the father of the Bill of Rights, told his
House colleagues:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to
the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumera-
tion; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were
intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I
75 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
76 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
77 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
78 Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
7 See id. ("By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a
great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.").
80 See U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
8I See id.
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have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution
[that became the Ninth Amendment].82
Madison also believed that the Bill of Rights would be vigorously enforced,
including the Ninth Amendment. He told his colleagues that if the Bill was
passed by Congress and ratified by the people,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
83
Unfortunately, Madison's confidence in the judiciary was misplaced.
The Ninth Amendment-like the Privileges or Immunities Clause-has
been effectively crossed out of the constitutional text. As Professor John
Hart Ely wryly observed:
Occasionally a commentator will express a willingness to read [the Ninth Amendment] for
what it seems to say, but this has been, and remains, a distinctly minority impulse. In sophis-
ticated legal circles mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to get a laugh.
("What are you planning to rely on to support that argument, Lester, the Ninth Amend-
ment?")
84
The Supreme Court has never given the Ninth Amendment any substantive
meaning, nor used it as a basis for any decision. Such blatant disregard for
constitutional text is contrary to commonsense and deeply respectful of the
people. As Chief Justice John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison," "It
cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be
without effect.""6
Just as the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause forced the
Court to look to the Due Process Clause as the textual basis for incorpora-
tion, the demise of the Ninth Amendment has also forced the Court to look
to the Due Process Clause to do the heavy lifting as the textual basis for its
recognition of unenumerated rights. The word "liberty" within the Due Pro-
82 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The last clause of Madison's fourth
proposal (the original version of the Ninth Amendment) read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall
not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people,
or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
Id. at 452.
83 Id. at 457.
John Hart Ely, The Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY
AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 179, 179 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
85 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
86 Id. at 174.
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cess Clauses has thus taken on disproportionate, substantive meaning, while
oddly the Court has shown a complete lack of interest in giving substantive
content to the other words, namely "life" and "property," in those Clauses."
The Court's substantive due process approach has thus had the predictable
consequence of encouraging judicial activism because the Court's analyti-
cal foundation-the Due Process Clause-provides no meaningful textual
or contextual clues as to its proper use or reach within this substantive terri-
tory.
The Court has attempted to give the substantive due process blob some
definition by creating a doctrine of "fundamental" rights. Pursuant to this
judge-made doctrine, to qualify as a fundamental right, the right as "care-
fully described" must be one that is "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.""'
Rights identified by this test as fundamental enjoy the benefit of strict scru-
tiny; laws affecting non-fundamental rights, by contrast, are subjected only
to modem rational basis review."
The fundamental/non-fundamental rights distinction is yet another re-
cent judicial invention, and it has not been consistently applied. Moreover,
as the reader can see from the description of the Court's "test" for deciding
whether an asserted right is fundamental, there is tremendous leeway for
judges to inject their own subjective preferences into this critical determina-
tion. What does "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"
mean? Does this mean that Anglo-American jurisprudence must have long
recognized the right being asserted? Or does it mean that such Anglo-
American jurisprudence must not have prohibited the right? For example,
one does not find a rich vein of Anglo-American jurisprudence recognizing
many rights we take for granted, such as skipping, wearing the color green,
or wearing a hat. Would such a lack of long-time legal sanction mean that
such things would not qualify as fundamental rights, allowing government
to restrict them for any reason short of the utterly irrational? Or would a
longstanding lack of prohibition of such things suggest they are, in fact,
fundamental in nature?
Consider a more substantial and controversial example such as mar-
riage: the Court has told us that the right to marry is a fundamental right,
yet it has never actually explained fully what this right consists of or why it
8 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
88 Washington v. Glucksberg, 520 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
89 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 n.9 (Souter, J., concurring).
2012] 925
GEO. MASON L. REV.
is fundamental, other than uttering conclusory sentences to that effect. " Is it
accurate to characterize state-sanctioned civil marriage as "deeply rooted"
in our history and tradition? Until relatively recently in Anglo-American
history, marriage was considered to be a religious status with which gov-
ernment interfered very little." Who, when, and how one could marry were
governed by religious authorities until the passage of Lord Hardwicke's
Marriage Act in England in 1753.' Is it the several hundred years prior to
Lord Hardwick's Marriage Act that should count in the Court's justifica-
tion, or should only the last two and a half centuries be considered? Is the
right to marry best "carefully described" as a right to exercise one's religion
and marry within the confines of that religion's rules, or as an affirmative
right to obtain a state-sanctioned civil marriage license? If it is the latter, is
it more accurate to describe the right as a right to marry one other person of
the opposite gender, as has been the unbroken historical Anglo-American
tradition? Or is it a broader right to marry whomever one loves, no matter
how many or what gender?
Even with the Court's attempt to handcuff itself from running wild in
the recognition of unenumerated rights, there is still serious potential for
subjectivism and hence, judicial activism. Indeed, one need look no further
than the types of unenumerated rights acknowledged by the Court as de-
serving of constitutionally protected status such as contraception," abor-
tion," marriage,95 and recreational sex." By contrast, other unenumerated
rights arguably as, or more deeply, rooted in Anglo-American history and
tradition-such as the freedom to pursue a lawful occupation, voluntarily
enter into binding contracts, own a business, or even own property-have
not been the subject of attention or explicit protection by the Court's sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence.97
While there may be legitimate reasons for recognizing some of the
unenumerated rights recognized by the Court thus far,9" the Court's stead-
9 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage as one of the "basic civil rights of man").
91 See Charles P. Kindregan Jr., The Marriage Debate in Historical Perspective: Changing Norms
and the Evolution of Civil Marriage 5-10 (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Faculty Publ'ns, Paper No. 32,
2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context-suffolk fp.
92 See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE: IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 35
(1977).
9 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
94 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
95 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
96 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
9 See James W. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation": The Evolution of
Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 952-54 (2006).
98 See Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 468-69 (1976).
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fast refusal to seriously ponder the nature and meaning of the Ninth
Amendment evinces a disturbing lack of judicial engagement directly con-
trary to the rule of construction provided by the amendment's text. Similar-
ly, the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence verges on the absurd, em-
ploying unclear standards in inconsistent ways, and evincing classic indicia
of judicial activism.
III. THE THIRD CENTURY OF RIGHTS: SOLVING THE IMBALANCE
THROUGH JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
The solution to judicial activism is proper judicial engagement.
Whether courts are construing the Constitution's provisions relating to in-
dividual rights or government powers-which, after all, are but two sides of
the same coin-judges should not be afraid to be meaningfully engaged in
the enforcement of individual rights. A judicial philosophy that counsels
judges to be engaged here, but not there, is an abdication of the judge's oath
to protect the Constitution. The oath requires the judge to internalize her
duty to protect the entire delicate structure, not merely portions of it that the
judge considers to be "more important" than others." The Constitution as a
whole is important; each word, each sentence, each clause, each article,
must be respected and defended with equal vigilance.
Perhaps the most intellectually honest method of accomplishing this
engagement objective is to jettison the present standards of review and the
arbitrary categorizations of individual rights. Unfortunately, however, the
damage seems to be done and, pragmatically, it would be virtually impossi-
ble to unravel this Gordian knot. Enormous interest and reliance has devel-
oped around these categories of review, especially for rights and groups that
have enjoyed the protective ambit of heightened review." Those who de-
fend these rights or represent these groups would not likely go quietly into
the good night and acquiesce to a more unified approach in the name of
intellectual honesty.
So what is to be done? One possible semi-solution that would lessen,
yet not eliminate, the impact of the Court's past activism would be to bulk
up rationality review, raising it, if you will, to a more engaged level. This
approach would ensure that the judiciary becomes more meaningfully en-
gaged in areas such as economic and non-fundamental rights, yet still not as
engaged as they are in non-economic, fundamental rights. This would leave
intact the heightened engagement for fundamental, non-economic rights,
9 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 773
(1990) ("Nothing in the text of the Constitution marks a special role for judges; each public official
applies the Constitution when it is time to act.").
100 See Jason Parish & Joy Haynes, Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic Partnerships, 5 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 545, 552-53 (2004).
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while simultaneously elevating engagement in the neglected category of
economic and non-fundamental rights.
In order to raise the standard of review for these long-neglected rights,
it would be preferable to borrow a standard with which the bench and bar
have some familiarity, rather than create a new standard out of whole cloth.
Along these lines, I would propose the use of "old-school" rational basis
review-the kind of rational basis review used by the pre-New Deal Court
in cases such as Nebbia v. New York.'o' Recall that this old-school rational
basis review-like modern rational basis review-only permitted the courts
to invalidate laws that were arbitrary or irrational. Yet at the same time, this
old-school rational basis review required the government to prove "a real
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." 02
By requiring the government to prove a close fit between the means
chosen and the purpose of the law, Nebbia's old-school rational basis re-
view inherently engaged both the government and the judges. It is a com-
mon-sense way of expressing the idea that if the government wants the
courts to defer to their legislative judgment that law X has been enacted to
serve legitimate purpose Y, the government should actually have to con-
vince the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Y was the true
motivating purpose behind the law.
Such a common-sense requirement is absent in modern rational basis
review, which requires judges to uphold laws if they can imagine any con-
ceivable legitimate purpose behind the law."o3 Such breathtaking deference
is the farthest thing from judicial engagement. It encourages governments
to be lazy and sloppy in their lawmaking, allowing them to enact law X for
inappropriate purpose Y, while evading all meaningful judicial scrutiny.
The government's lawyers can be confident that, pursuant to modern ra-
tional basis review, the judges will sustain law X if the government's law-
yers or the judges themselves can imagine that there might have been (but
actually were not) other, appropriate purposes that could have been served
by the law. Perversely, this complete deference standard transforms judges
into advocates on behalf of the government and against the citizen. Need-
less to say, this is not, by any stretch of the imagination, proper judicial
engagement.
In many ways, the old-school rational basis review I am advocating is
essentially what is happening already in a series of rights cases that have
become known as "rationality review with bite" cases, including City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.," Romer v. Evans,'o and Law-
101 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
102 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
103 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
104 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
105 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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rence v. Texas." In these cases, the Court gave lip service to modem ra-
tional basis review, but these decisions did not feel highly deferential. One
reason for this feeling is that in each of these cases, despite rational basis
review, the citizens challenging the law won.'o This is an extremely unusu-
al outcome, given the degree of deference modern rational basis review
normally involves.
But beyond their unusual outcomes, these cases are given the "ration-
ality review with bite" label because the Court seemed to be giving some
"teeth" to modern rational basis review. Rather than reflexively deferring,
the Court seemed to demand that the government prove not only a legiti-
mate purpose behind the law, but also some actual evidence of a meaning-
ful relation, or fit, between the ends articulated and the means chosen to
achieve them. In Cleburne, for example, a city denied a special use permit
for the construction of a home for the mentally retarded.' 8 The city justified
its decision by reference to its concerns about the safety of the residents,
safety of nearby residents and schoolchildren, the property's location in a
flood zone, density of the home itself, and the home's potential impact on
nearby traffic and neighborhood tranquility.'" While all of these purposes
would normally qualify as "legitimate" government interests, the Cleburne
Court believed they were merely pretext for discriminatory animus, and
concluded: "The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears
to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded. . . .0"o
Such meaningful scrutiny of the government's motivation is often war-
ranted, and can be accomplished by demanding the government articulate
the purpose served by the law. This would allow both parties to introduce
evidence on the legitimacy of that purpose, and then determine whether the
purpose is substantially served by the law. In Cleburne, for example, the
City of Cleburne asserted that its zoning ordinance was "aimed at avoiding
concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the streets,""'
yet the Supreme Court did not simply accept this otherwise legitimate inter-
est as furthered by the ordinance. Rather, it stated that such "concerns obvi-
ously fail to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses,
hospitals and the like, may freely locate in the area without a permit."" 2
Notice that this approach-inquiring as to why the city failed to similarly
restrict density in other types of housing-is not something the Court would
normally do under rational basis review. By allowing-and considering-
evidence on other types of housing, the Court engaged in a level of scrutiny
106 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
107 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576, 578-79; Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50.
108 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
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noticeably higher than modem rational basis review. In doing so, the Court
did not place a heavy burden on the government, but it did place some bur-
den on the government, and it allowed the citizen to introduce evidence
challenging both the legitimacy of that alleged purpose and the law's rela-
tionship to that purpose. Under modern rational basis review, by contrast,
the government's burden would have been non-existent, and the citizen's
burden would have been virtually impossible to meet: namely, proving that
the law could not possibly, by any stretch of the imagination, serve any
conceivable legitimate government purpose.
Employing this sort of rationality review with bite-akin to old school
rational basis review-could help restore judges' proper role as protectors
of our written Constitution. It would allow courts to jettison modern ration-
al basis review, which effectively and awkwardly asks judges to assume the
role of advocate on behalf of the government. More meaningful rationality
review thus would help reduce the gap between highly demanding strict
scrutiny and completely deferential modern rational basis review. It would
level the playing field of constitutional rights somewhat, allowing courts to
take all rights more seriously, not just those deemed "fundamental" or
"non-economic" or "enumerated." Though I do not advocate, for pragmatic
purposes, eliminating all of these categories, I do believe there is a need to
rethink, in a more global fashion, our courts' approach to recognizing and
enforcing constitutional rights. Moving even a baby step toward a more
unitary approach to rights would help restore a more meaningful level of
judicial engagement, preserve the written Constitution, and, ultimately,
enhance respect for our government and the Constitution.
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